Limiting Reduction and Modified Gravity (forthcoming) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (with Antonis Antoniou)
Online since 2025 ·
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Modified Newtonian Dynamics (MOND) is a framework of theories that adjust Newton's laws of gravity to explain effects such as galactic rotation anomalies, offering an alternative to dark matter. This essay examines the justification of MOND by assessing its inter-theoretical relationship to established theories across relevant scales, in particular its connection to Newtonian gravitation. We argue that MOND fails a key condition for a theory's justification—what we call `reduction-wise justification'—since it does not adequately reduce to Newtonian gravity in a fully non-arbitrary way. More precisely, despite satisfying the standard formal criteria for successful limiting reduction, MOND does not properly reduce to Newtonian gravitation because of (i) the absence of a fundamental theoretical framework to justify the interpolating function introduced in MOND and (ii) the lack of a unified mathematical structure working across all scales, independent of Newtonian theory. Hence, the case study of MOND provides crucial results for the general debate on inter-theoretic reduction in science: MOND’s failure as a case of reduction highlights important limitations in standard accounts of limiting reduction. We respond by proposing a more refined framework for limiting reduction that introduces two additional criteria to better distinguish successful from pathological reductions. More broadly, this case illustrates how analysing reduction-wise justification can serve as a powerful tool for evaluating the validity of novel theories that are not yet empirically established.
Making Sense of Gravitational Thermodynamics (2025) Philosophy of Physics, 3(1), 5.
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The use of statistical methods to model gravitational systems is crucial to physics practice, but the extent to which thermodynamics and statistical mechanics genuinely apply to these systems is a contentious issue. This paper provides new conceptual foundations for gravitational thermodynamics by reconsidering the nature of key concepts like equilibrium and advancing a novel way of understanding thermodynamics. The challenges arise from the peculiar characteristics of the gravitational potential, leading to non-extensive energy and entropy, negative heat capacity, and a lack of standard equilibrium. Hence it has been claimed that only non-equilibrium statistical mechanics is warranted in this domain, whereas thermodynamics is inapplicable. We argue instead that equilibrium statistical mechanics applies to self-gravitating systems at the relevant scale, as they display equilibrium in the form of metastable quasi-equilibrium states. We then develop a minimal framework for thermodynamics that can be applied to these systems and beyond. Thermodynamics applies in the sense that we can devise macroscopic descriptions and explanations of the behaviour of these systems in terms of coarse-grained quantities like energy and temperature within equilibrium statistical mechanics.
Two Forms of Functional Reductionism in Physics (2024) Synthese, 203(2), 66.
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Functional reductionism characterises inter-theoretic reduction as the recovery of the upper-level behaviour described by the reduced theory in terms of the lower-level reducing theory. For instance, finding a statistical mechanical realiser that plays the functional role of thermodynamic entropy allows to establish a reductive link between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. This view constitutes a unique approach to reduction that enjoys a number of positive features, but has received limited attention in the philosophy of science. This paper aims to clarify the meaning of functional reductionism in science, with a focus on physics, to define both its place with respect to other approaches to reduction and its connection to ontology. To do so, we develop and explore two alternative versions of functional reductionism, called Syntactic Functional Reductionism and Semantic Functional Reductionism, that expand and improve the basic functional reductionist approach along different lines, and make clear how the approach works in practice. The former elaborates on David Lewis' account, is connected with the syntactic view of theories, employs a logical characterisation of functional roles, and is embedded within Nagelian reductionism. The latter adopts a semantic approach to theories, spells out functional roles mainly in terms of mathematical roles within the models, and is expressed in terms of the related structuralist approach to reduction. The development of these frameworks has the final goal of advancing functional reductionism, making it a fully developed account of reduction in science.
Effective Ontic Structural Realism (forthcoming) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (with James Ladyman)
Online since 2023 ·
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Three accounts of effective realism (ER) have been advanced to solve three problems for scientific realism: Fraser and Vickers (forthcoming) develop a version of ER about non-relativistic quantum mechanics that they argue is compatible with all the main realist versions (‘interpretations’) of quantum mechanics avoiding the problem of underdetermination among them; Williams (2019) and Fraser (2020b) propose ER about quantum field theory as a response to the problems facing realist interpretations; Robertson and Wilson (forthcoming) propose ER to deal with the dubious ontological status of the entities belonging to superseded theories. This paper argues for the unification of these proposals based on realism about modal structure and the idea of scale relativity of ontology developed by ontic structural realists. This solves problems some or all the accounts of ER face, especially that of making explicit in what way they are realist. Furthermore, we respond to a recent critique that has been raised against the ontic structural realist account of quantum mechanics that we employ.
Functionalism, Reductionism, and Levels of Reality (2023) Philosophy of Science, 90(4), 922-936.
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I consider a problem for functional reductionism, based on the following tension. Say that b is functionally reduced to a. On the one hand, a and b turn out to be identical, and identity is a symmetric relation. On the other hand, functional reductionism implies that a and b are asymmetrically related: if b is functionally reduced to a, then a is not functionally reduced to b. Thus, we ask: how can a and b be asymmetrically related if they are the same thing? I propose a solution to this tension, by distinguishing between ontological levels and levels of description.
Functionalising the Wavefunction (2022) Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 96, 141-153.
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Functionalism is the view that being x is to play the role of x. This paper defends a functionalist account of three-dimensional entities in the context of Wave Function Realism (WFR), that can explain in detail how we can recover three-dimensional entities out of the wavefunction. In particular, the essay advocates for a novel version of WFR in terms of a functional reductionist approach in the style of David Lewis. This account entails reduction of the upper entities to the bottom ones, when the latter behave appropriately. As applied to WFR, it shows how the wavefunction can turn out to be identical to three-dimensional objects, provided certain conditions. The first major goal of the paper is thus to put forward an improved and more rigorous version of WFR, which dissolves several extant issues about the theory, and can serve as a starting point for future literature on the topic. Moreover, the second major goal of the article is to take WFR as a case study to demonstrate the pros of functional reductionism, especially in the form defended here, thereby helping to bring this view back in the philosophy of science debate. The positive upshots of this paper suggest a possible application of functional reductionism also to other contexts.
Lam and Esfeld have argued that, within Bohmian mechanics, the wave function can be interpreted as a physical structure instantiated by the fundamental particles posited by the theory. Further, to characterize the nature of this structure, they appeal to the framework of Ontic Structural Realism, thereby proposing a structuralist interpretation of Bohmian mechanics. However, I shall point out that OSR denotes a family of distinct views, each of which maintains a different account about the relation between structures and objects, and entails a different kind of ontology. Thus, in this paper I will show how to articulate the structuralist approach to Bohmian Mechanics accordingly to the different standard versions of OSR, and I will evaluate these alternatives. Moreover, I will propose a novel and sui generis kind of structuralist interpretation of Bohmian Mechanics, based on the framework of metaphysical coherentism.
A Refined Propensity Account for GRW Theory (2021) Foundations of Physics, 51(2), 43.
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Spontaneous collapse theories of quantum mechanics turn the usual Schrödinger equation into a stochastic dynamical law. In particular, in this paper, I will focus on the GRW theory. Two philosophical issues that can be raised about GRW concern (i) the ontology of the theory, in particular the nature of the wave function and its role within the theory, and (ii) the interpretation of the objective probabilities involved in the dynamics of the theory. During the last years, it has been claimed that we can take advantage of dispositional properties in order to develop an ontology for GRW theory, and also in order to ground the objective probabilities which are postulated by it. However, in this paper, I will argue that the dispositional interpretations which have been discussed in the literature so far are either flawed or–at best–incomplete. If we want to endorse a dispositional interpretation of GRW theory we thus need an extended account that specifies the precise nature of those properties and which makes also clear how they can correctly ground all the probabilities postulated by the theory. Thus, after having introduced several different kinds of probabilistic dispositions, I will try to fill the gap in the literature by proposing a novel and complete dispositional account of GRW, based on what I call spontaneous weighted multi-track propensities. I claim that such an account can satisfy both of our desiderata.
It has been argued that Humean Supervenience is threatened by the existence of quantum entanglement relations. The most conservative strategy for defending HS is to add the problematic entanglement relations to the supervenience basis, alongside spatiotemporal relations. In this paper, I’m going to argue against this strategy by showing how certain particular cases of tripartite entanglement states–i.e. GHZ states–posit some crucial problems for this amended version of HS. Moreover, I will show that the principle of free recombination–which is strictly linked to HS–is severely undermined if we add entanglement relations to the supervenience basis. I conclude that the conservative move is very unappealing, and therefore the defender of HS should pursue other, more controversial, strategies.
Book Reviews
'Scientific realism from the bottom-up' (2026), Metascience. Review of Michel Ghins, Scientific Realism and Laws of Nature: A Metaphysics of Causal Powers (Springer, 2024). Published
Edited Collections
'The Aims and Methodologies of Contemporary Metaphysics' (2025), Synthese Topical Collection, lead guest editor (co-edited with Pyro Suarez and Tommaso Soriani).
Popular Articles
'What do Newtonian Forces have to do with the Standard Model?' (2024),
BJPS Short Read
'The Trouble With Limits: What frontier galactic physics can teach us about justifying new physics' (in preparation), BJPS Short Read
In Preparation
A paper on functional reduction in biochemistry (with Francesca Bellazzi)
A paper on the formal characterisation of functionalism (with Joshua Babic)
A paper on Newton–Cartan theory and its metaphysical implications (with Enrico Cinti & Marco Sanchioni)
A pair of papers on the ontology of space and time and their relation with spacetime (with Fabrice Correia & Damiano Costa)
A paper on perspectival realism and tense realism in General Relativity (with Nicola Bamonti)
A review on tense realism in General Relativity (with Nicola Bamonti & Damiano Costa)
A paper on the correspondence between quantum statistical entropy and thermodynamic entropy (with Niccolò Covoni and Eugene Chua)
A paper on black hole thermodynamics (with Yichen Luo)
An essay on the philosophy of the laws of physics (with Alessandro Giordani)
PhD Thesis
My PhD thesis 'Functional Reduction in the Physical Sciences' is
here.